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Special Contribution
Premises Liability and
Apportionment Following Martin v.
Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P.
by Madeline E. McNeeley*
and Jed D. MantonA nineteen-year-old boy's innocent trip to an amusement park ended
in a brutal beating and permanent brain damage. The boy's efforts to
hold accountable those responsible for the tragedy ultimately resulted in
much-needed clarification of Georgia's law regarding negligent security
and apportionment of fault. It is now clear that a landlord can be held
responsible for damages caused by criminal activity even when the
damages occur beyond the four corners of the landlord's property.
Likewise, Martin elucidates that errors in a jury's apportionment verdict
can be retried without disturbing the verdict as to liability and damages.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF MARTIN

Joshua Martin went to Six Flags Over Georgia on July 3, 2007 with
his brother and a friend' to celebrate the friend's admission to college. 2

&

*Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP. University of Tennessee (B.A.
B.S., magna cum laude, 1999); University of Maryland, College Park (M.S., 2001);
University of Tennessee College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2008). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
-Partner in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP. Dartmouth College (B.A., with
honors, 2001); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., with honors, 2006). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. Martin v. Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 324, 801 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2017).
2. Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P. v. Martin, 335 Ga. App. 350, 351, 780 S.E.2d 796, 800
(2015) (en banc), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Martin, 301 Ga. at 323, 801 S.E.2d at 24.
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Shortly before 9:00 p.m., as the amusement park's closing time
approached, the trio left the park, went to use a nearby restroom, and
returned to wait in front of the park for a Cobb County Transit (CCT)
bus. They sat on a guardrail near the park's main entrance. 3 The bus stop
was around the corner at the intersection of Six Flags Parkway and
South Service Road, about 200 feet from the park's property line and
within the teens' sight.4
Earlier in the day, a large group of fifteen to forty young men gathered
in the park. They had been running around, "yelling obscenities, and
otherwise causing a commotion." 5 Several of them, including some offduty Six Flags employees, "accosted and threatened" two families, the
Queens and the Tapps.6 When park security approached, the young men
made finger-gun gestures and told Mr. Tapp and Mr. Queen to "watch
your back" and "we'll get you in the parking lot."7 The security officers
reprimanded some of the assailants but allowed them to go back into the
park despite company policy stating that they should have been ejected.
Shortly before closing time, the group of now approximately forty young
men ran to the main exit in what was described as a "frenzy;" security
guards followed them out, stood outside watching for a period, and then
reentered the park. The group of young men remained on Six Flags
property, gathering on the sidewalk outside the gates. When the Tapp
and Queen families exited shortly thereafter, the group followed them
and yelled at them. The families reached their cars and left, but the group
was still actively planning to get into a fight.8
The group made their way back toward the area outside the main gate
of the park, planning to fight someone at the bus stop. Within five
minutes of abandoning the Tapp and Queen families, the group
encountered Martin, his brother, and their friend at the guardrail. The
boys went to the bus stop to try to escape, but one member of the group
approached Martin and began beating him with brass knuckles. About
eight other members of the group joined in-hitting Martin's brother and
friend as well-beating and stomping Martin so badly that he was
rendered comatose. Martin was in a coma for seven days and suffered
severe injuries, including permanent brain damage. 9

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 351, 780 S.E.2d at 800.
Martin, 301 Ga. at 324-25, 801 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 325, 801 S.E.2d at 28.
Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 351, 780 S.E.2d at 800.
Martin, 301 Ga. at 325, 801 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 325-26, 801 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 326, 801 S.E.2d at 28-29.
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Martin sued Six Flags10 on a negligent-security theory, as well as
suing several individual assailants." Before the case was given to the
jury, Six Flags sought to add additional nonparty assailants to the verdict
form for purposes of apportionment of fault. The trial court denied this
request, ruling "that it would only consider including individuals who
had a criminal conviction related to the attack or who personally testified
to their involvement." 12
Based on the events of that night and evidence of a pattern of gang
activity Six Flags failed to address or tried to conceal,1 3 the jury rendered
a $35 million verdict in Martin's favor against Six Flags and four
individual defendants. 14 The jury apportioned the award 92% to Six Flags
and 2% against each of the four liable individuals.15 Six Flags appealed
the finding that it was liable to Martin and the trial judge's denial of its
request to allow the jury to apportion fault to three nonparty assailants. 16
II. LANDOWNER LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
A landowner "is liable in damages to [invitees] for injuries caused by
his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and
approaches safe."' 7 "The general rule is that a landlord is not an insurer
of his tenant's safety; however, the landlord does have a duty to exercise
ordinary care to prevent foreseeable third-party criminal attack upon"
business invitees. 18 "[I]f the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal
act, he or she then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against
injury from dangerous characters."1 9
10. "Six Flags" here and in the appellate opinions refers collectively to Six Flags Over
Georgia II, L.P., and Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC. See id. at 324 n.1, 801 S.E.2d at 27 n.1.

11. See Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 352, 780 S.E.2d at 800.
12. Id. at 365, 780 S.E.2d at 809. One of the proposed nonparties did have a criminal
conviction connected to the attack, but the judge "expressed reluctance to include" him
"because there was no evidence that the person physically touched Martin." Id.
13. See id. at 361-62, 780 S.E.2d at 806-07.
14. Martin, 301 Ga. at 324, 801 S.E.2d at 27.
15. Id.
16. Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 350, 780 S.E.2d at 799. Martin's cross-appeal of a jurycharge issue and a technical matter regarding the judgment were dismissed as moot by the
Georgia Court of Appeals and not addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court. Martin, 301
Ga. at 324, 801 S.E.2d at 27; Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 350, 780 S.E.2d at 799.
17. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2017).
18. Jackson v. Post Props., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 701, 701, 513 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1999);
accord Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 785-86, 482 S.E.2d 339, 340
(1997); TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 462, 590 S.E.2d 807, 816
(2003); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 179, 210 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1974).
19. SturbridgePartners, 267 Ga. at 786, 482 S.E.2d at 341 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492, 405 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991)).
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In an ordinary negligent-security case, a landowner's liability turns on
questions of foreseeability and superior knowledge; the matter of
whether the criminal act even occurred on the premises and approaches
will be straightforward. 20 Martin, however, presented a more
complicated scenario. 21 The build-up to the criminal activity began
within and immediately outside the park, but Martin was not actually
beaten until after he moved off the property and away to the bus stop in
an effort to escape the attackers. 22
The court of appeals framed the issue as whether the CCT bus stop
could be considered to come within the "approaches" of the Six Flags
premises. 23 Approaches generally include public ways that are "directly
contiguous, adjacent to, and touching" the premises' entryways so they
are "within the last few steps taken by invitees" when entering or exiting
the premises and "a reasonable invitee would find it necessary or
convenient to traverse" them in order to enter and exit. 24 Prior case law
demonstrated, however, that noncontiguous areas also could be deemed
"approaches" under certain circumstances:
"[N]on-contiguous property can be deemed an approach because the
landowner extended the approach to his premises by some positive
action on his part, such as constructing a sidewalk, ramp, or other
direct approach." . . . [T]his exception is premised on the fact that "the
owner or occupier of land, for his own particular benefit, has

affirmatively
property." 25

exerted control over a public way or another's

The court reviewed the evidence and determined that under the
specific facts of the case, Six Flags had exerted sufficient control over the
CCT bus stop and public roadways-for example, directing customers to
use the bus stop, constructing barricades and signs to direct foot traffic
toward it, sending security staff to aid in directing traffic on the public
streets leading to the park, and maintaining the pertinent stretch of
roadway and sidewalk-that the bus stop could be considered an

20. Martin, 301 Ga. at 328, 801 S.E.2d at 30.
21. Six Flags also argued on appeal that the evidence related to foreseeability and
causation was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. See Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 36063, 780 S.E.2d at 806-08. The court of appeals and supreme court both upheld the jury's
findings of fact on this quintessential jury question. Id. at 363, 780 S.E.2d at 807-08, aff'd,
Martin, 301 Ga. at 332, 801 S.E.2d at 32-33.
22. Martin, 301 Ga. at 326, 801 S.E.2d at 28-29.
23. Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 352, 780 S.E.2d at 801.
24. Motel Props., Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 485-86, 436 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1993).
25. Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 353-54, 780 S.E.2d at 801 (quoting Motel Props., Inc.,
263 Ga. at 486, 436 S.E.2d at 198).
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"approach," and that the jury correctly found Six Flags owed a duty to its
business invitees who used the stop. 26
The supreme court disagreed with the reasoning of the court of
appeals. 27 In its view, the facts did not support the conclusion that Six
Flags had shown such a positive exercise of dominion over the bus stop
and surrounding roadways as to bring them within the park's
approaches. 28 The court did not end its inquiry there, however. Instead,
it reframed the question entirely: What happens to the landowner's duty
if foreseeable criminal activity begins within its premises and approaches
but the act is concluded, and the injuries inflicted, after the victim and
attacker have moved outside the premises? 29
The court decided that "[t]his case stands for the common sense
proposition that a property owner does not escape liability for an attack
that begins on its premises simply because the victim moves outside the
premises before the attack is completed." 30 Nothing in the statute
required the victim's injuries to "be inflicted within the four corners of a
landowner's premises and approaches in order for liability to attach." 31
In fact, prior Georgia Court of Appeals cases such as Wilks v. Piggly

Wiggly Southern, Inc.32 and Double View Ventures, LLC v. Polite33 had

found landowner liability where an invitee stepped off the premises into
a nearby footpath or vacant area. 34 These cases recognized that a
landowner's liability in a negligent-security case "from an attack that
originates on the premises does not dissipate as soon as the invitee
steps-or flees--off the property, so long as the invitee's injuries were
proximately caused by the landowner's failure to exercise ordinary care
in maintaining safety and security within its premises and
approaches." 35 The court expressly adopted the principle "that although
the landowner's duty is to maintain safety and security within its
premises and approaches, liability may arise from a breach of that duty
that proximately causes injuries even if the resulting injury ultimately is

26. Id. at 354-60, 780 S.E.2d at 801-05.
27. Martin, 301 Ga. at 324, 801 S.E.2d at 27.
28. Id. at 333-36, 801 S.E.2d at 33-35.
29. Id. at 329, 801 S.E.2d at 30.
30. Id. at 329, 801 S.E.2d at 30-31.
31. Id. at 329, 801 S.E.2d at 31.
32. 207 Ga. App. 842, 429 S.E.2d 322 (1993).
33. 326 Ga. App. 555, 757 S.E.2d 172 (2014).
34. Martin, 301 Ga. at 329-30, 801 S.E.2d at 31 (discussing Wilks, 207 Ga. App. at
842-43, 429 S.E.2d at 322 and Double View Ventures, 326 Ga. App. at 560, 757 S.E.2d at
177, as well as cases from other jurisdictions).
35. Martin, 301 Ga. at 329, 801 S.E.2d at 31.
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completed beyond that territorial sphere." 36 In this case, the court held
that Six Flags owed a duty to Martin and that the jury's finding of
liability was sound. 37
While not a dramatic shift in premises-liability law, this holding is, as
the court notes, a common-sense approach to landowner liability for
conduct completed off the landowner's premises and usefully clarifies the
reach of prior case law. The CCT bus stop was about 200 feet from the
Six Flags property line, down the street and around the corner from the
entrance to the park 38-significantly further removed than the footpath
at issue in Double View Ventures.39 The decision in Martin makes clear
that when an attack arises from foreseeable criminal activity on a
landowner's property, but the attack spills off the premises or the victim
attempts to flee, the landowner may not claim that mere lack of proximity
of the final act absolves the landowner of responsibility for its failures. 40
Instead, the court and factfinders still must consider the traditional
factors for landowner liability-foreseeability, equal or superior
simply taking the crime's
knowledge, and ordinary care 4 1-while
physical proximity to the premises and its temporal proximity to the
invitee's presence on the premises into account as part of the
foreseeabilityanalysis.42 "The landowner's duty is to take the steps within
its premises that are necessary to protect its invitees from risks that
could reasonably be foreseen in connection with the invitee's presence on
the premises, which necessarily requires both temporal and physical
proximity . . . ."43 Including temporal and physical proximity among the
other foreseeability factors "ensure[s] that a landowner's liability to its
invitees maintains its connection to the landowner-invitee relationship
44
giving rise to the duty in the first place."

III. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES

Although substantively a case about the scope of premises liability,
Martin also presented a question of first impression in a procedural area:
How to correct errors in the jury's apportionment of damages. The legal

36. Id. at 330, 801 S.E.2d at 31.
37. Id. at 335-36, 801 S.E.2d at 35.
38. Id. at 334, 801 S.E.2d at 34.
39. See Double View Ventures, 326 Ga. App. at 559, 757 S.E.2d at 176-77.
40. Martin, 301 Ga. at 331-32, 801 S.E.2d at 32.
41. Jackson, 236 Ga. App. at 701-02, 513 S.E.2d at 261; SturbridgePartners, 267 Ga.
at 785-86, 482 S.E.2d at 340-41.
42. Martin, 301 Ga. at 330-31, 801 S.E.2d at 31-32.
43. Id. at 331-32, 801 S.E.2d at 32 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 331, 801 S.E.2d at 32.
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context in which Martin arose highlights the significance of the Georgia
Supreme Court's opinion.
The Tort Reform Act of 200545 (the Act) eliminated joint and several
liability in Georgia, replacing it with a scheme of apportioning fault
among joint tortfeasors.46 Section 51-12-3147 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) previously provided that in a case brought
against joint tortfeasors, "the plaintiff may recover damages for the
greatest injury done by any of the defendants against all of them." 48 The

2005 Act replaced this Code section with new language providing only for
several liability: "Except as provided in Code Section 51-12-33, where an
action is brought jointly against several persons, the plaintiff may
recover damages for an injury caused by any of the defendants against
only the defendant or defendants liable for the injury."49
At the same time, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-335o was amended to create a
framework for assigning such liability among defendants.5 1 Subsection
(b) of the statute provides that each liable defendant shall only be
responsible for the percentage of the damages apportioned to that
defendant by the jury:
[Tihe trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages
to be awarded, if any, shall . .. apportion its award of damages among
the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each
person. Damages apportioned by the trier of fact as provided in this
Code section shall be the liability of each person against whom they
are awarded, shall not be a joint liability among the persons liable, and
shall not be subject to any right of contribution. 52
Particularly relevant here, subsections (c) and (f) of the statute provide
for apportionment of fault to nonparties:
(c) In assessing percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider the
fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or

45. Ga. S. Bill. 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified in tits. 9, 24, 33, 43, and 51 of
the O.C.G.A.).
46. See McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 850-53, 725 S.E.2d 584, 586-88 (2012).
47. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-31 (2017).
48. Ga. H.R. Bill 1188, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ga. Laws 6, § 51 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-31) (prior to 2005 amendment).
49. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-31.
50. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2017).
51. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1, § 12 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33).
52. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
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damages, regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have
been, named as a party to the suit.

(f)(1) Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used
only in the determination of the percentage of fault of named parties.
(2) Where fault is assessed against nonparties pursuant to this Code
section, findings of fault shall not subject any nonparty to liability in
any action or be introduced as evidence of liability in any action. 53
In the years since the Act's passage, the Georgia Supreme Court has
issued several opinions addressing the real-world operation of nonparty
apportionment. Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. 5 4 clarified that the jury must
determine, according to "the degree to which each tortfeasor's actions
contributed to the damages" of the plaintiff, "the percentage of fault of
each person," including both negligent and intentional tortfeasors-such
as, in that instance, a criminal assailant in a negligent-security case.55
In Zaldivar v. Prickett,5 6 the court addressed nonparty apportionment
in a scenario where the allegedly at-fault nonparty not only was not sued,
but legally could not be held liable. 57 The court held that "fault" as used
in the statute is not equivalent to "liability"; rather, fault exists when
someone commits a tort that is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries, but the person may have defenses or immunities that cut off
liability for that tort.5 8 Therefore, the factfinder is to consider the
contributions of "all persons or entities who have breached a legal duty
in tort that is owed with respect to the plaintiff, the breach of which is a
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff," including
"every . . . tortfeasor whose commission of a tort as against the plaintiff
was a proximate cause of his injury, regardless of whether such tortfeasor
would have actual liability in tort to the plaintiff."59 Importantly, the
court also clarified the defendant bears the burden of proof to show the
nonparty owed a legal duty in tort to the plaintiff, the nonparty breached
that duty, and the nonparty's breach was a proximate cause of the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c), (f)(1)-(2) (2017).
291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
Id. at 361-62, 729 S.E.2d 380-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297 Ga. 589, 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015).
Id. at 589-91, 774 S.E.2d at 690-91.
Id. at 597-98, 774 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 600, 774 S.E.2d at 697.
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plaintiffs injuries; the trier of fact cannot assign fault to the nonparty
unless that burden is met.60
As the court worked through the details of which nonparties may be
included in the apportionment of fault, the mechanics of correcting errors
in the inclusion or exclusion of nonparties remained less clear. Indeed, at
the time the courts reviewed the Martin case, there were no post-Act
cases directly on point. Martin, then, provided the first clear opportunity
to address squarely how apportionment errors should be corrected and
retried.
Six Flags argued, and the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed, that the
trial court erred by refusing to allow the jury to consider whether fault
should be apportioned to three of the men allegedly involved in the attack
on Martin.6 1 The question, then, was how to correct this error. 62 Was a
full retrial required or could a portion of the jury's verdict be preserved? 63
The majority acknowledged that nothing in the plain language of
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 expressly mandated a full retrial, but decided the
language of subsection (b)-that "the trier of fact, in its determinationof
the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall ... apportion its
award of damages"-indicated that the same jury must both find liability
and "determine the respective fault of those involved." 64 Furthermore,
the majority believed a full retrial was required by the court's prior ruling
in Double View Ventures: "Since there is some evidence showing that the
[nonparty] may have contributed to [the victim's] injuries, we [were]
constrained to reverse the jury's verdict because the jury did not have the
opportunity to consider whether the [nonparty] should be apportioned
fault."6 5 The court acknowledged that retrial would impose a significant
burden and that the jury's finding of liability was valid, but the majority

60. Id. at 604, 774 S.E.2d at 699. The court's subsequent opinion in Walker v. Tensor
Machinery, Ltd., 298 Ga. 297, 779 S.E.2d 651 (2015), reaffirmed that fault may be
apportioned regardless of whether defenses and immunities to liability exist, clarifying that
fault may be apportioned to those immune from suit due to the exclusive-remedy provision
of the Worker's Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. Walker, 298 Ga. at 304, 779 S.E.2d
at 656.
61. Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 363-65, 780 S.E.2d at 808-09. The Georgia Supreme
Court did not grant certiorari as to whether the trial court erred in this regard, limiting its
apportionment question to how the error found by the Georgia Court of Appeals should be
corrected. Martin, 301 Ga. at 336-37, 801 S.E.2d at 35.
62. Martin, 301 Ga. at 336, 801 S.E.2d at 35.
63. Id. at 337, 801 S.E.2d at 35.
64. Six Flags, 335 Ga. App. at 366, 780 S.E.2d at 810 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b)).
65. Id. (alteration in original).
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nevertheless felt the significance of the apportionment error and the
court's commitment to the right to a fair jury trial required a full retrial. 66
In a special concurrence, Judge Yvette Miller disagreed.6 7 She opined
that Six Flags and the other named defendants should not "get a second
opportunity to dispute their liability when the overwhelming evidence in
the case establishes their liability for Martin's injuries and when the
error in the case related solely to a determination of damages."68 The
statute expressly provides that the fault of nonparties relates only to the
percentage of the damages for which the named parties shall be held
liable; it does not affect whether the named parties are liable.69 Therefore,
if the only error is in the apportionment of fault to nonparties, there
should be no need to retry the issue of the named parties' liability. 70
Judge Miller further noted that the law-of-the-case doctrine should
preclude the relitigation of liability.7 1 She concluded the majority was
wrong to rely on Double View Ventures as precedent for this issue; none
of the parties in that case questioned whether the retrial should be full
or partial, and the court had not squarely considered it.72 Judge Miller
would have remanded the case for a retrial only as to damages rather
than impose the significant burden of a full retrial. 73
The Georgia Supreme Court largely sided with Judge Miller. As both
she and the majority had acknowledged below,74 the language of the
statute does not specify how apportionment errors should be corrected.75
The supreme court noted, however, that common law prescribes severing
issues for retrial where possible:
"[W]here a judgment is entire and indivisible, it cannot be affirmed in
part and reversed in part, but the whole must be set aside if there [is]
reversible error therein. But where a judgment appealed from can be
segregated, so that the correct portions can be separated from the

66. Id. at 367, 780 S.E.2d at 810.
67. Id. at 367-68, 780 S.E.2d at 811 (Miller, J., concurring specially). Judges McFadden
and McMillian joined in this special concurrence. Id. at 369, 780 S.E.2d at 812.
68. Id. at 368, 780 S.E.2d at 811.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 369, 780 S.E.2d at 812.
72. Id. at 368-69, 780 S.E.2d at 811-12.
73. Id. at 369, 780 S.E.2d at 812.
74. See id. at 366, 780 S.E.2d at 810 (majority opinion).
75. Martin, 301 Ga. at 337, 801 S.E.2d at 36.
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erroneous, the court will not set aside the entire judgment, but only
that portion which is erroneous." 76
Apportionment is an issue that lends itself to such severability.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 "requires that, once liability has been established
and the damages sustained by the plaintiff have been calculated, the
[jury] must then assess the relative fault of all those who contributed to
the plaintiffs injury-including the plaintiff himself-and apportion the
damages based on this assessment of relative fault."7 7 Thus, finding
liability and the total amount of damages "is the first step, and the
allocation of relative fault and award of damages according to that
allocation is a distinct second step."7 8
The court concluded "[t]here is no reason these two steps cannot be
segregated for purposes of retrial," agreed with Judge Miller that the
law-of-the-case doctrine would preclude re-litigation of liability, and went
a step further to say the amount of damages sustained also would be
settled.7 9 Furthermore, the statutory language cited by the Georgia Court
of Appeals in assuming a single factfinder would make all these
determinations is no different from the usual presumption of a single
factfinder in contexts where partial retrials have been permitted.80
Construing the language to preclude partial retrials would conflict with
existing law, including § 51-12-33(f),81 stating that nonparty fault should
not bear on the assessment of named parties' liability or on the
determination of the plaintiffs damages. 82
The defendants' final argument for a full retrial arose from pre-2005
cases involving errors in the finding of comparative negligence of
plaintiffs and defendants, but the court held that even if those precedents
remained good law, the percentage of comparative negligence assigned to
a plaintiff can affect the defendant's liability in a way nonparty fault

76. Id. at 338, 801 S.E.2d at 36 (alteration in original) (quoting Chicago Bldg. & Mfg.
Co. v. Butler, 139 Ga. 816, 819, 78 S.E. 244, 246 (1913)).
77. Id. at 338, 801 S.E.2d at 36-37.
78. Id. at 338-39, 801 S.E.2d at 37.
79. Id. at 339-40, 801 S.E.2d at 37-38. The court also took the precautionary step of
overruling Double View Ventures to the extent it suggested apportionment errors required
a full retrial, though the court agreed with Judge Miller's position that the lack of analysis
to that effect meant the majority had, perhaps, over-interpreted that language in the
Double View Ventures opinion. See id. at 341 n.12, 801 S.E.2d at 38 n.12.
80. Id. at 339, 801 S.E.2d at 37.
81. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(f) (2017).
82. Martin, 301 Ga. at 339, 801 S.E.2d at 37.

12

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

almost never will. 83 Therefore, in "the ordinary case"-which this wasthe finding of liability and the calculation of damages will be distinct and
segregable from the assessment of the relative fault of parties and
nonparties, and the correct procedure is to remand the case for retrial
only as to the issue of how fault should be apportioned. 84
This holding truly is significant. Twelve years after the abolishment of
joint and several liability and the introduction of the apportionment
scheme-which introduced significant added complexity to judges' and
juries' work at trial-the law still provided no guidance on the essential
issue of how to fix the errors that inevitably would arise. The court's
decision to allow partial retrials of apportionment errors where the
liability finding and total damages calculation are sound is a commonsense approach to this challenge. Upholding the liability and damages
findings is consistent with the law of the case and shows the respect for
jury verdicts that is fundamental to our justice system. Although the
court acknowledged much of the evidence related to apportionment will
overlap with that pertaining to liability,8 5 a partial retrial does at least
provide the opportunity to streamline the scope of the new trial and to
reduce the burden imposed by a retrial of what was likely a complicated
case.
Practitioners may also note a potential implication of how the court
described the jury's task under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. The court described
the jury as completing two "distinct" steps: First, the jury must decide
whether the named defendants were liable and calculate the amount of
the plaintiffs damages, and second, the jury must allocate fault among
the various parties, including the plaintiff, and nonparties. 86 The verdict
forms proposed for use in apportionment trials today vary from lawyer to
lawyer, from case to case, and from judge to judge. However, Martin
suggests a structure the jury's verdict form generally should track: First,
whether the jury's verdict is in favor of the plaintiff or the named
defendants, and if the former, a calculation of the plaintiffs total amount
of damages, without consideration of how anyone contributed to those
damages; second, how fault for those damages should be allocated among
the parties and approved nonparties. The opinion in Martin does not
specifically disapprove of an alternate verdict form (such as placing the
damages calculation at the end or even combining the liability and

83. Id. at 340-41, 801 S.E.2d at 37-38. The rule that a plaintiff may not recover at all
if they are 50% or more at fault for their own injuries is codified currently at O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33(g) (2017).
84. Martin, 301 Ga. at 341, 801 S.E.2d at 38.
85. Id. at 341 n.13, 801 S.E.2d at 38 n.13.
86. Id. at 338-39, 801 S.E.2d at 36-37.
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apportionment findings into a single step).8 7 It appears, though, the best
practice for a clean appellate record is to organize the verdict form around
the Georgia Supreme Court's description of the separate and distinct
tasks the jury must perform.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Martin case presented the Georgia Supreme Court with a valuable
opportunity to clarify an uncommon but important issue in negligentsecurity law and to resolve a critical complication created by the Georgia
General Assembly's scheme of nonparty apportionment. While the case
may appear at first blush to be relevant primarily to premises-liability
lawyers, the supreme court's apportionment ruling makes Martin a
foundational case important for all trial lawyers.

87.

See generally id.
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